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Abstract* 
The demographic makeup of the U.S. workforce is changing. The popu-
lation between ages SS and 64 is projected to increase significantly by 2020, 
but employment rates for this age group have not been increasing. Employ-
ers will likely need to encourage critical employees in this age group to delay 
retirement. Phased retirement is one tool for delaying retirement, while also 
not continuing full-time employment, so it can be a compromise for employers 
and employees. 
Both Congress and two administrative agencies have begun to consider 
changes in pension laws and regulations that would be needed to accommodate 
phased retirement for employers who sponsor defined benefit plans. This 
paper discusses some of the impediments in the current legal framework and 
changes that could be made without diluting participant protections. This 
paper also discusses aspects in the actuarial calculation of retirement benefits 
that impact the financial neutrality of a phased retirement program. 
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1 Introduction 
As America ages, the demographic makeup of the workforce will 
change. The U.S. Bureau of the Census projects that, between 2000 and 
2020, the number of people between ages 55 and 64 will grow 73.5%, 
going from 24,276,000 in 2000 to 42,107,000 in 2020. At the same 
time, the population from age 25 to 54 is projected to remain level. 
From 1995 to 2002, employment rates remained level for men ages 
55 to 61 and rose for women ages 55 to 61, as well as for both men 
and women ages 62 to 64. Labor force participation rates, however, 
are much lower for both men and women ages 5 5 to 64 than for those 
ages 25 to 54. In 2001, 91% of men and 76% of women ages 25 to 54 
participated in the labor force compared to 68% of men and 53% of 
women ages 55 to 64.1 If the current labor force participation rates 
continue, the pool of available workers will decline as the population 
ages. Consequently, employers will need to find ways to retain their 
productive older workers. 
Factors influencing the employment rate among people age 55 and 
older include economic conditions, Social Security benefits, and the 
prevalence and design of private pensions (Purcell, 2002). Since the 
repeal of mandatory retirement, 2 phased, or gradual, retirement is be-
ginning to replace cliff retirement where a person retires from the work-
force and does not return. According to Watson Wyatt (l999a, page 
2) "phased retirement is any arrangement that enables employees ap-
proaching normal retirement age to reduce their work hours and job re-
sponsibilities for the purpose of gradually easing into full retirement." 
Many older Americans are staying in or re-entering the workforce 
in part-time and contingent work situations; see Herz (1995), Quinn 
(1999), and Wiatrowski (2001). Sixteen percent of the companies par-
ticipating in a 1999 Watson Wyatt survey offered phased retirement 
programs (Watson Wyatt, 1999b, page 9). According to one estimate, 
roughly one-third of older workers leave their long-held career jobs and 
begin new jobs that serve as a bridge to full retirement.3 In another 
1999 Watson Wyatt survey, phased retirement was more prevalent at 
firms in which workers have an average age of 45 or higher (Watson 
Wyatt, 1999a, page 3). 
IThe statistics cited above are taken from Purcell (2002). 
2 Mandatory retirement is still allowed for certain highly compensated employees. 
3Committee for Economic Development (CEO). New Opportunities for Older Work-
ers. New York, NY: Committee for Economic Development, 1999. Available at 
<http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report_older.pdf>. 
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Clearly, both employers and employees are interested in phased re-
tirement, but, unfortunately, the U.S. pension system was not designed 
with an eye toward phased retirement. Many companies face serious 
legal impediments to establishing an effective phased retirement pro-
gram. Congress and the administrative agencies charged with oversee-
ing ERISA are aware of at least some of these obstacles. In 2000, one of 
the working groups of the Department of Labor's ERISA Advisory Coun-
cil focused on phased retirement.4 Representative Earl Pomeroy (D-
N.D.) and Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) introduced legislation that 
would have changed federal pension law to allow qualified retirement 
plans to provide in-service distributions once an employee reaches age 
591/2 or 30 years of service.s In 2002, the IRS solicited "comments on 
issues relating to 'phased retirement' arrangements under qualified de-
fined benefit plans."6 
This paper discusses the impact of phased retirement on benefits 
provided by a traditional final average pay defined benefit pension plan. 
It also presents some of the legal, administrative, and public policy con-
cerns raised by phased retirement. An earlier paper by Scahill and For-
man (2002) explored in depth the impact of phased retirement on ben-
efit amounts under various payout patterns. They compare common 
offsets for benefits paid against continued accruals with an actuarially 
neutral approach that avoids excessive offsets when only part of the 
benefit is being paid out during phased retirement. That research is 
not reproduced in this paper. 
2 Overview of Phased Retirement 
2.1 What Is Phased Retirement? 
The definition of retirement is not simple. It is not just the time 
when an employee stops working and begins receiving retirement ben-
o efits. It has become a more complex activity. People often work while re-
ceiving retirement benefits. Long-term employees may retire from one 
career and go on to another career. Some choose to work less-phasing 
out of their full-time jobs. Other employees leave their career job and 
work for another employer, usually part time. This jab is used to bridge 
4Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Report of 
Working Group on Phased Retirement. Available at 
<http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/phasedrl.htm>. 
sThe Phased Retirement and Liberalization Act (5. 2853/H.R. 4837) (2000). The bill 
was not voted out of committee in either the House or the Senate. 
6Internal Revenue Service Notice 2002-43, 2002-27 IRB 38. 
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the transition from full-time work to full retirement and is referred to 
as a bridge job. Bridge jobs are often different from the person's ca-
reer job, perhaps requiring different skills in a different industry. Cur-
rent impediments to in-service distributions from defined benefit plans 
during phased retirement may force workers to use a bridge job as the 
phased retirement vehicle rather than a reduced work schedule on the 
career job. 
This paper focuses on the type of phased retirement in which an em-
ployee works a reduced schedule on the career job prior to full retire-
ment from that job. It does not discuss other retirement arrangements 
such as bridge jobs. 
2.2 The Importance of Phased Retirement 
Phased retirement is not a new phenomenon. It is expected to in-
crease in irrtpottance for the U.S. workforce as the large cohort of baby 
boomers begins to reach retirement age. The baby boomer generation 
is often defined as those born from 1946 through 1964. The oldest of 
the baby boomers have already begun to reach age 5 5-a common age 
for early retirement eligibility in defined benefit plans. They will begin 
reaching age 65 in 2011. With increased longeVity and more healthy 
years, many baby boomers will have an active life well beyond age 65. 
EBRI's 2001 Retirement Confidence Survey reported that 26% of re-
tirees say they have worked either full time or part time since they 
retired (ERBI, 2001, page 1 of "Retirement in America" fact sheet). Not 
all employees will have other sources of income, such as investment in-
come, to supplement their earned income during phased retirement, so 
they may need to access at least a portion of their pension as they ease 
into full retirement. The current U.S. pension system does not facilitate 
phased retirement, especially for participants in defined benefit plans 
who want to begin receiving pension benefits prior to normal retirement 
age while continuing to work. The conflict between part-time work and 
phased retirement is an example of unintended consequences in U.S. 
pension law. Legislative and/or regulatory changes that allow employ-
ers and workers to structure in-service access to retirement benefits will 
be necessary if phased retirement is to become an attractive alternative 
to a significant segment of baby boomers. 
2.3 Individualized Phased Retirement Arrangements 
One advantage of phased retirement is that it allows employees and 
employers to negotiate individualized part-time work schedules during 
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phased retirement. One employee may want to gradually decrease the 
hours worked each year while another employee may prefer to begin 
with a significant drop in the full-time work schedule and to fully retire 
after a few years of that reduced schedule. Individualized phased re-
tirement work schedules are no more complicated for the employer to 
administer than different part-time schedules for workers. 
Based on business needs, the employer might designate certain po-
sitions as available for part-time hours for phased retirees. In other 
situations, the employer may want to retain a valuable employee, so it 
makes business sense to accommodate the employee's desire to ease 
into retirement with a reduced work schedule. On the other hand, if an 
employee is only a marginal employee, the employer has little or no mo-
tivation to negotiate a special work schedule or transfer the employee 
to a part-time position. It is legal for an employer to differentiate be-
tween employees based on work performance, but it is not legal for an 
employer to discriminate on the basis of any protected classification, 
including age. 
One possible change in pension regulations, would be to allow pay-
ment of partial benefits prior to normal retirement, but the partici-
pant must be working a reduced schedule. If the employer refuses a 
marginal employee's request to phase into retirement by working a re-
duced schedule, the employee might claim his or her ERISA rights were 
violated because the employer's refusal to allow phased retirement in-
terfered with early access to retirement benefits. The employer should 
maintain careful documentation about when and why phased retire-
ment working arrangements are or are not permitted in order to be 
successful in any such legal challenge. 
3 Financi:}1 Neutrality of Payouts 
This discussion of financial neutrality of phased retirement payouts 
begins with the premise that phased retirement should be beneficial to 
both the employer and the employee. One way to assess the impact 
of a phased retirement arrangement is to weigh the cost and benefit 
of the arrangement. The primary benefit to the employee is flexibility 
in designing the transition from full-time work to full retirement and 
being able to work a reduced schedule at the career job rather than 
being forced to use a bridge job. The primary cost to the employee 
is reduced income that results from a reduced work schedule. The 
employee can use personal savings or in-service retirement benefits to 
help offset the reduction in compensation during phased retirement. 
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From the employer's perspective, the main benefit of allowing part-
time work during phased retirement is retaining a valued employee.7 
The balance between that benefit and any cost of an individualized 
phased retirement arrangement will help determine whether a particu-
lar arrangement makes business sense. The cost, if any, of paying in-
service retirement benefits depends on whether those payments prior 
to normal retirement are subsidized.8 Other costs the employer might 
incur are outside the scope of this paper.9 
The key to financial, or actuarial, neutrality in pension payouts is for 
the plan to make a full actuarial reduction for early retirement distri-
butions as well as a full actuarial increase for benefits accruing during 
continued employment after normal retirement. Actuarial assumptions 
must also be consistent in the calculation of early retirement reduc-
tions, delayed retirement increases, and conversion from the normal 
payout method to optional payout methods to achieve this actuarial 
neutrality) 0 
If a participant is entitled to a certain monthly lifetime annuity be-
ginning at normal retirement, the benefit is reduced if it commences at 
an earlier date because the participant will receive more benefit pay-
ments.ll It is common for defined benefit plans to pay actuarially 
subsidized benefits to participants who retire prior to normal retire-
ment. These subsidized benefits may have been part of a workforce 
management program that encouraged employees to retire early as a 
way of creating opportunities for younger workers through turnover. 12 
A full actuarial reduction for early commencement and a full actuarial 
increase for delayed commencement refer to the situation where the 
actuarial value of the benefit payouts is the same regardless of when 
7Because the employer is not required to permit a full-time worker to change to a part-
time schedule, the employer has no motivation to make phased retirement available to 
marginal, or even average, workers. 
8Subsidized early retirement benefits are discussed below. It is highly unusual for 
the actuarial adjustment to payments that commence after normal retirement age to 
be subsidized. 
9These other costs could include the cost of benefits such as life or health insurance. 
lOIf a defined benefit plan pays lump sums to phased retirees, this actuarial neutrality 
may not be possible because of actuarial assumptions currently mandated for lump sum 
calculations. 
11 Under a lifetime annuity, benefits are payable until death. Regardless of when pay-
ments begin, payments cease upon the participant's death. As a result, the younger the 
participant is when benefits begin, the more benefit payments will be received during 
the participant's lifetime. 
12These subsidized benefits likely have continued from a prior era of generous pen-
sion benefits if they remain in the plan. From the authors' experience, plan sponsors 
today are no longer adding subsidized early retirement benefits to plans. 
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they begin. Both subsidized early retirement benefits and subsidized 
delayed retirement benefits are more valuable than the corresponding 
benefit commencing at normal retirement. Participants receive more 
valuable benefits by commencing payments at the age when the sub-
sidy is the highest. As a result, the cost of the benefits to the pension 
plan is highest when the participant maximizes the value of benefits by 
timing payments to begin when the subsidy is the highest. 
If retirement benefits are finanCially neutral, there will be no finan-
cial impact on the employer if the employee decides to supplement his 
or her phased retirement income with pension plan distributions. This 
financial, or actuarial, neutrality is achieved when the present value of 
the expected pension payments does not change because the employee 
decides to phase into retirement and begins receiving in-service distri-
butions rather than fully retiring immediately. Actuarial, or financial, 
neutrality also means that the plan is neither better off nor worse off 
financially because of the in-service distributions an employee receives 
during phased retirement. 
If a partiCipant terminates under a pension plan and is eligible to 
begin receiving pension distributions at early retirement, normal re-
tiremen~, or any time between, the employer does not participate in the 
participant's decision of when to begin pension payments. Benefits paid 
prior to normal retirement may be subsidized, but the employer does 
not discourage the employee from receiving these distributions. Simi-
larly, once the phased retirement pattern is negotiated, the employee is 
free to decide when to commence pension distributions within the con-
straints of the law. If in-service payouts are permitted prior to normal 
retirement 13 and those benefits are subsidized, the cost of offering the 
flexibility of phased retirement to employees who are under the nor-
mal retirement age will be higher because of the increased cost of the 
subsidized retirement benefits. On the other hand, if the retirement 
benefits are not subsidized, there will be no cost to the employer if the 
employee receives in-service distributions prior to normal retirement. 
4 Final Average Pay Benefit Issues 
Most defined benefit plans base benefits on compensation, and most 
of those plans use a variation of final average pay.14 For example, the 
13 As discussed elsewhere in this paper, regulatory and/or legislative changes will be 
needed for these payments to be available. 
140f the defined benefit plans surveyed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 76% used 
some form of final or final average compensation in their benefit formulas; see Employee 
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plan's benefit formula might be 1% of average pay multiplied by credited 
service. If a five-year averaging period is used, average pay could be 
the average of the highest five consecutive compensation amounts or 
it might use the highest five consecutive compensation amounts of the 
final ten years.IS 
Although it is not true in all cases, most employees receive salary 
increases throughout their working career. As a result, pay in the years 
immediately preceding retirement would produce the highest average. 
If the employee begins working a reduced work schedule just before re-
tirement, pay received during the year will be lower than if the employee 
had continued working full time. Because those final years would pro-
duce the highest average if the participant continued working full time, 
the employee will have a lower final average compensation as a result 
of phasing into retirement. If the plan defines final average compensa-
tion as the average of the highest five compensation amounts during 
the employee's entire working career, the final average itself will not 
decline during phased retirement. It will not be as large, however, as it 
would have been if the final years had been full-time years. 
The definition of final average pay clearly has a significant impact on 
the effect of phased retirement on the retirement benefits payable from 
a final average pay plan. Internal Revenue Code §401(a)(4) regulations 
have special provisions for employees working less than full time in 
a safe-harbor-design plan using final average compensation. I6 These 
rules allow the plan to drop years or months in which the participant 
works fewer than a specified number of hours. These drop-out rules 
would only help a participant who returns to full-time work prior to 
retirement. 
Because phased retirement should be structured to benefit both the 
employee and the employer, it seems unfair not to reflect pay increases 
in final average pay used to determine the benefit amount. To be sure 
the worker gets the benefit of pay rate increases during phased retire-
ment, the plan could annualize pay during phased retirement years 
similar to the approach some plans use for any participant who does 
not work a full-time schedule. From the authors' experience, the most 
common approach is to annualize pay when the participant receives a 
Benefits in Medium and Large Private Establishments, 1995, U.S. Department of Labor, 
April 1998, Table 114. 
15Plans that integrate benefits with Social Security (Le., use permitted disp<\rity de-
scribed in IRe §401(l)) are required to use consecutive compensation amounts in deter-
mining final average pay. See §1.401(a)(4)-3(e)(2)(ii)(E). 
16 § lAO 1 (a)( 4)-3(e)(2)(ii)(D). 
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partial year of service when not working a full-time scheduleY If the 
plan credits a partial year of service for a year in which a participant 
works fewer than a threshold number of hours, a participant working 
part time while phasing into retirement would receive a partial year of 
service.18 In order to avoid double prorating, the plan would then annu-
alize compensation for that year. 19 Other approaches are available to 
assure the phased retiree receives credit for pay increases while phasing 
into retirement in the calculation of final average compensation (Scahill 
and Forman, 2002). 
5 Public Policy Issues In IRS Notice 2002-43 
In 2002, the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department 
requested "comments on issues relating to 'phased retirement' arrange-
ments under qualified defined benefit plans."2o The Notice acknowl-
edges that both employees and employers are interested in encourag-
ing older, more experienced workers to remain in the workforce and 
phased retirement is one approach to offering a smoother transition 
from full-time work to full retirement. 
The Notice raises a concern that allowing earlier access to retirement 
income could increase the possibility of the person outliving retirement 
savings. Phased retirement can provide additional time to save prior to 
full retirement. On the other hand, if the person needs to access retire-
ment savings during phased retirement, phased retirement will begin 
the payout of those retirement savings sooner. If retirement savings 
are converted to a lifetime annuity, early distribution will not' increase 
the risk of outliving retirement savings. Early distribution as a lifetime 
annuity increases the risk of inadequate retirement income because the 
distribution is reduced for early commencement.21 
17The authors have encountered plans sponsored by health care industry employers 
using this approach. 
18Some plans credit a full year of benefit accrual service for a year in which the partic-
ipant earns 2,000 or more hours and credit a fraction of a year equal tCl hours worked 
divided by 2,000 for a year in which the participant works at least 1,000 hours but fewer 
than 2,000 hours. Many other service crediting options are available. 
19If a full-time employee works 2,000 hours and the phased retiree works 1,500 hours, 
pay for that year for the phased retiree would be annualized by multiplying pay received 
by 1.333 (2,000 + 1,500). 
20 Internal Revenue Service Notice 2002-43, 2002-27 IRE 38. 
21 As discussed above, benefits that begin prior to normal retirement are generally 
reduced to reflect the fact that the person will receive benefits over a longer period of 
time. The actuarial reduction is required to maintain actuarial neutrality and not in-
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The authors are pleased that the IRS and the Treasury Department 
are interested in finding ways to encourage employees and employers 
to find mutually beneficial phased retirement arrangements as well as 
finding ways to protect retirees from the risk of outliving retirement 
savings or having inadequate retirement income. The following are 
some of the specific issues raised in Notice 2002-43: 
• The primary purpose of qualified retirement plans is to provide 
benefits after retirement. Under what circumstances would allow-
ing defined benefit plan participants to begin receiving in-service 
retirement income distributions prior to normal retirement be 
consistent with this purpose? 
• Should rules allowing in-service distributions consider the extent 
to which the participant has reduced his or her work schedule? 
e If in-service distributions prior to normal retirement are allowed, 
how should additional benefits that accrue during continued em-
ployment be calculated? 
- How should reductions in compensation be addressed? 
- How should early retirement subsidies22 be taken into ac-
count? 
• How should the definition of uniform benefits under nondiscrim-
ination testing be changed? 
• What guidance would be needed concerning qualified joint and 
survivor annuities and qualified preretirement survivor annuities 
requirements? 
• What guidance should be provided concerning anti-backloading23 
and maximum benefit24 limitations? 
• How should phased retirement be distinguished from the situa-
tion in which an employee terminates retirement and is rehired 
as a consultant or independent contractor? 
crease the actuarial value of the payout stream. The participant will have lower monthly 
benefits, however, even though the actuarial value of the distributions has not changed. 
22For the definition of early retirement subSidy, see discussion concerning actuarially 
neutral benefits in Section 3 above. 
23IRC §411. 
24IRC §415. 
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6 Is Phased Retirement Good Public Policy? 
Workers currently have the option of easing into retirement without 
changing jobs, but there are pitfalls inherent in the current legal frame-
work if an employer who sponsors a defined benefit plan offers phased 
retirement, including in-service pension benefits. Is it good public pol-
icy to change the law or issue regulations to support phased retirement? 
On the one hand, one could argue that providing workers with more 
opportunity to manage the end of their career is good public policy. 
Rather than forcing employees to change jobs in order to access their 
retirement benefits, employees would be able to continue their career 
job at a reduced schedule and receive a portion of their retirement ben-
efits. The law would need to be changed or regulations would need to 
be issued to make this option a realistic one. 
Some may be concerned that employers will force out older work-
ers. Does phased retirement increase the risk that older workers who 
are not ready to reduce their work schedule will, instead, be forced 
out altogether? There is nothing inherent in phased retirement that 
increases the opportunity for age discrimination. 
Whether to allow workers who are phasing into retirement access to 
a full distribution from the retirement plan is another public policy is-
sue. Participants may need access to pension benefits in order to subsi-
dize reduced earnings during phased retirement. As discussed earlier, 
benefits that commence prior to normal retirement are generally re-
duced to reflect the fact that they will be paid over a longer period. The 
periodic lifetime benefit is smaller if payments begin at a younger age. 
If the full accrued benefit is payable at the beginning of phased retire-
ment, the participant faces a significant risk of inadequate income after 
full retirement. If the participant subsidizes the reduced pay2S during 
phased retirement by receiving the full accrued benefit rather than just 
a portion of the accrued benefit, the employee will have a significant 
reduction in pension income upon full retirement when earned income 
stops. On the other hand, if the participant only receives a portion of 
the accrued benefit during phased retirement, the participant will be 
able to receive a larger pension distribution upon full retirement when 
the untapped portion of the accrued benefit becomes payable in addi-
tion to the portion payable during phased retirement. This additional 
pension distribution will almost certainly be less than the income dur-
ing phased retirement, but it lessens the income reduction upon full 
retirement. 
25Pay will be reduced during phased retirement because the employee is no longer 
working a full-time schedule. 
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In exchange for removing some of the current legal obstacles to a 
flexible phased retirement program, the government would likely re-
quire that phased retirement be available on a nondiscriminatory ba-
sis. Employers would be faced with the issue of whether a phased 
retirement program is retaining primarily highly skilled and effective 
workers or ones who are no longer effective. Employers who offer early 
retirement incentive programs face the same type of problem. The so-
lution to this problem does not lie in the particulars of the retirement 
program, but instead it lies in effective workforce management. Just 
as employers are not required to employ anyone who wants to work 
for them, requiring employers to accept an individualized phased re-
tirement program from any employee wanting to phase into retirement 
would interfere with business management. 
The authors believe phased retirement is good public policy as long 
as the law is changed to facilitate phased retirement programs and pro-
tections are put in place to prevent abuse. 
7 Basic Legal Considerations 
Workers who elect phased retirement and who do not want to be-
gin early distributions from the pension plan are free to take phased 
retirement under current pension law and regulations. 
There are many legal considerations that impact a phased retirement 
program that seeks to allow participants access to in-service pension 
benefits prior to normal retirement age. We will discuss some of the 
major ones that affect defined benefit plans: 
• Paying partial retirement benefits before full retirement, 
• Offsetting continuing benefit accruals by the value of in-service 
distributions, and 
• In-service distributions before the plan's normal retirement age. 
Paying Partial Benefits Before Full Retirement:26 Although there 
is nothing specific in ERISA that prohibits defined benefit plans from 
paying partial benefits, there are a number of obstacles that may make 
these benefits impractical. For example, an employee taking phased re-
tirement might want to receive 50% of his accrued benefit while working 
50% of a full-time work schedule. ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code 
26See Section 6 above for a discussion of problems caused by paying the full retire-
ment benefit prior to full retirement. 
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and related regulations refer to commencement of benefits, calcula-
tion of accrued benefits, spousal consent, etc. as they apply to the full 
pension. The statute and related regulations do not discuss paying a 
portion of the benefit beginning at one date and then paying the full 
benefit at a later date. 
One question is how to increase the remaining portion of the ac-
crued benefit for the period of phased retirement after normal retire-
ment age.27 If the benefit were not actuarially increased, the participant 
would need to be given a suspension of benefits notice for the portion 
of the benefit for which payment is delayed. If the benefit were actuar-
ially increased, the employer would need guidance on how the increase 
would be calculated. Would it apply to the full accrued benefit or to 
only the portion not in pay status? The actuarial increase must ap-
ply to the entire accrued benefit in order to achieve actuarial neutrality 
as defined in this paper. See Scahill and Forman (2002) for a detailed 
demonstration of one method for achieving actuarial neutrality. 
Offsetting Continued Accruals for Value of In-Service Distribu-
tions: ERISA and the Internal Revenue -Code prohibit the discontinu-
ance of benefit accruals or a reduction in the rate of benefit accrual 
because of the attainment of any age. 28 Proposed regulation §1.411(b)-
2 provides details on the calculation of the accrued benefit after normal 
retirement age if in-service benefits are being paid out, but it only per-
tains to continued benefit accruals beyond normal retirement age.29 
The challenge for sponsors who want to design a balanced phased 
retirement program is how to offset for partial annuity distributions. If 
the entire additional benefit accrual were offset by the annuity value of 
the benefits paid, it is likely that no further benefits would accrue after 
partial distributions commence. The increase in the benefit ultimately 
paid out at full retirement over the benefit payable at the beginning of 
phased retirement might only be the elimination of the early retirement 
reduction. See Scahill and Forman (2002) for a detailed demonstration 
of various offset alternatives. 
There are alternative ways to design the offset if the law and/or 
regulations accommodate these alternatives. If only 50% of the accrued 
benefit is being paid out prior to full retirement, the offset might apply 
only to half of the additional benefit accrual. As a result, the participant 
would continue to accrue at least 50% of what would have been accrued 
if no distributions had been received. This approach achieves actuarial 
27Both the DOL and IRS have specific rules that apply to benefits that are not paid out 
while an employee continues working after normal retirement. 
28IRC §411(b)(1)(H) and ERISA §204(b)(l)(H). 
29See Example 3 of §1.411(b)-2 for a detailed discussion of these calculations. 
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neutrality. If the plan uses a full actuarial reduction before normal 
retirement and a full actuarial increase after normal retirement, the 
plan does not experience an actuarial gain or loss as a result of paying 
in-service benefits prior to full retirement. 
In-Service Distributions Before Normal Retirement Age: Under 
current law, a defined benefit plan cannot make in-service distributions 
before the plan's normal retirement age.30 Many defined benefit plans 
use age 65 as the normal retirement age. Employees who want to begin 
phased retirement before the plan's normal retirement age are not able 
to use pension benefits to supplement earned income during phased 
retirement. Two-thirds of the companies participating in the Watson 
Wyatt phased retirement survey favor eliminating the restrictions on 
paying in-service distributions before normal retirement as a way to 
facilitate phased retirement (Watson Wyatt, 1999b, page 3). 
Participants who want to maintain their prior standard of living dur-
ing phased retirement will likely need personal savings, in addition to 
access to a portion of their retirement income, to supplement their pay 
during phased retirement. As discussed earlier, it does not seem to be 
good public policy to allow access to the full retirement benefit while 
the participant phases into retirement by working a reduced schedule. 
Pension benefits will not be sufficient to replace the reduction in com-
pensation during phased retirement. Employees already face the need 
to have personal savings available during retirement to maintain their 
pre-retirement standard of living because Social Security and the em-
ployer's pension benefit rarely combine to replace 100% of the person's 
income just prior to retirement. The need for personal savings to use 
during phased retirement is no different. 
8 Impact of Phased Retirement 
8.1 On Participant Protections 
One of the purposes of ERISA was to provide protection to partic-
ipants. Some of the areas of protection could be impacted by phased 
retirement. 
30Treas. Reg. §1.401-l(b)(1)(i) states "[a] retirement plan within the meaning of sec· 
tion 401(a) is a plan established and maintained by an employer primarily to provide 
systematically for the payment of ... benefits to his employees ... after retirement." In 
PLR 8137048, the IRS applied this regulation and concluded that an employee may not 
receive a distribution from a pension plan before normal retirement while still an active 
employee. 
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Disclosure: Effective communication about the plan lets partici-
pants understand and take advantage of the benefits offered-it is one 
of ERISA's participant protections. Plan sponsors will be challenged to 
provide understandable information about phased retirement because 
of the many choices available to the participant.31 Additional commu-
nication material may be needed to explain phased retirement options. 
The complexity of the communication materials depends on the flexibil-
ity of the phased retirement options available to participants. Because 
phased retirement is an individual arrangement, the communications 
will need to be tailored to the participant's particular situation. It will 
be important to disclose the impact, if any, of reduced pay and credited 
service on the ultimate retirement benefit. The participant also needs to 
understand the impact of in-service distributions on the ultimate annu-
ity amount. Helping the participant assess the relative value of various 
options will help the participant make the best personal choice. 
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA)32 
of 2001 enhanced the notice requirements for plans reducing the rate 
of future benefit accruals. Although these requirements will not ap-
ply to phased retirement, they provide useful guidance on the types of 
communication that could be helpful to employees considering phased 
retirement. Under the EGTRRA disclosure rules, the average partici-
pant should be able to understand the communication, and it must 
give enough information to explain the impact of the provision on the 
participant. 
Software that allows participants to model their benefits under vari-
ous phased retirement scenarios can be helpful for participants who are 
comfortable using these tools. In other situations, the sponsor could 
use a workbook or a series of benefit exhibits to help participants un-
derstand the effect of phased retirement on their retirement benefits. 
Benefit Accrual Rules:33 The benefit accrual rules look at the rate 
of benefit accrual throughout the full employment period. Their basic 
purpose is to prevent backloading of benefits, 34 and the demonstration 
31 Examples of some of the choices are how much to reduce the full-time work sched-
ule, whether (or when) to commence retirement plan distributions, and the payment 
method for those distributions. 
32Econornic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
115 Stat. 38 (2001). 
33r.R.C. §419b); ERISA §204. 
34Backloading refers to benefit accruals that increase steeply either as service in-
creases or after a certain number of years of service. For example, a benefit formula 
providing 0.25% of average pay for each of the first 20 years of service and 2% of pay for 
each of the next 5 years of service would be considered a back-loaded formula. After 
25 years of service, 5% of average pay would have been earned during the first 20 years 
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of compliance of the benefit formula with the rules is typically based on 
a full-time employee. As a result, a plan that allows phased retirement 
should not have problems satisfying one of the accrual rules. Partici-
pants will continue earning benefit accrual service as long as they work 
the required number of hours, assuming the plan uses hours to credit 
service.35 
Nondiscrimination Protection:36 The mechanical nondiscrimina-
tion rules can create problems for employers who try to accommodate 
employees who want to phase into retirement. The 2000 ERISA Advi-
sory Council's Working Group on Phased Retirement recommended the 
following nondiscrimination test alternatives to the Secretary of Labor: 
• Permit a facts and circumstances test for phased retirement provi-
sions in a pension plan, as an alternative to passing the mechanical 
nondiscrimination test. 
• Develop safe harbors and/or special rules addressed to phased 
retirement programs that accommodate their special characteris-
ticsY 
8.2 On Spousal Protections 
The primary areas of spousal protection are the following ERISA 
requirements (Forman, 2000): 
• Spousal consent for certain forms of benefit payment, and 
• Amount of qualified surviving spouse annuity (QJSA)38 and qual-
ified pre-retirement spousal death benefit (QPSA). 
Spousal Consent: Spousal consent is only an effective protection if 
the spouse understands the impact of waiving the qualified joint and 
survivor annuity (QJSA). If the participant works a reduced schedule 
of employment and 10% of average pay would have been earned during the final five 
years of employment. This formula backloads the benefit accrual because it provides 
a much larger value for later years of service. 
35Plans that use elapsed time for service credits .will credit a full year of service for 
each full year during phased retirement. Plans requiring a certain number of hours 
for a year of service may credit less than a year of service during phased retirement, 
depending on the hours actually worked. 
36I.R.c. §401(a)(4). 
37See page 3 of the reference in footnote 4. 
38A qualified joint and surviving spouse annuity (QJSA), as defined in §417(b), is an 
annuity that pays the surviving spouse no less than 50% and no more than 100% of the 
amount payable while the participant is living and receiving benefits. 
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during phased retirement, but he or she does not elect to receive any 
pension benefits before full retirement, spousal consent will not be af-
fected by phased retirement. 
If the participant elects to receive benefits during phased retirement, 
spousal consent would be required if the benefit were not payable in 
the form of a QJSA when phased retirement benefits begin. Upon full 
retirement, the original spousal consent would continue to apply to the 
additional benefit that will be payable unless the plan requires a new 
spousal consent.39 The requirement of multiple spousal consents may 
be confusing to the spouse, so the plan sponsor should try to ensure 
that the spouse understands that the initial consent only applies to the 
initial partial benefit. 
Amount of Qualified Joint Survivor Annuity (QJSA) and Qualified 
Preretirement Survivor Annuity (QPSA): If participants elect phased 
retirement in a final average pay plan and the final average pay de-
creases during phased retirement, the ultimate retirement benefit may 
be lower than if the participant continued working full time. Therefore, 
the QJSA as well as the QPSA will be lower as a result of lower annual 
pay during phased retirement. 
Although it is not reasonable to expect the spouse to have the right 
to consent to a reduced work schedule as part of phased retirement, 
there is an erosion of some of the spousal protections on account of 
phased retirement. 
9 Deferred Retirement Option Plans (DROPs) 
Some public sector retirement plans include deferred retirement op-
tion plans (DROPs) that allow workers to continue working and have re-
tirement benefits deposited into a separate account that earns interest. 
The participant receives the value of the DROP account upon full retire-
ment, generally no more than five years after electing to have benefits 
deposited into the DROP. 
DROPs can be structured to apply once the participant has become 
eligible for unreduced benefits or to apply also to participants who are 
eligible for an early retirement subsidy. If the DROP is only available 
to participants who are eligible for unreduced benefits, the DROP ef-
fectively lets the participant take the unreduced benefit without having 
to retire. In this situation, DROPs would be attractive to participants 
39Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Public Law No. 107-16, 
115 Statutes at Large 38 (2001) 
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who do not need retirement income as a supplement during phased 
retirement. 
If the DROP applies to participants eligible for subsidized early re-
tirement benefits, it allows the participant to receive that subsidy with-
out having to terminate employment. The subsidized benefit is de-
posited in the DROP and earns interest until retirement. At retirement, 
the subsidized early retirement benefit would be the monthly benefit 
payable to the participant. As long as the earnings on the DROP are 
sufficient to protect the value of the early retirement subsidy, the par-
ticipant will end up with more valuable lifetime benefits because the 
participant will receive the value of the early retirement subsidy. Even 
though the benefits paid out after retirement are reduced as if the par-
ticipant had retired early, the value of the DROP could more than com-
pensate for the cost of the early retirement reduction in the lifetime 
benefit. 
10 Conclusion 
Phased retirement provides employees with important options for 
managing the end of their working careers. It provides employers with 
a way to retain valuable knowledge workers who no longer want to work 
full time. It is important for U.S. pension law and regulations to be mod-
ified to facilitate phased retirement, but those changes should include 
safeguards to protect workers and spouses as they make decisions that 
will have a lifetime financial impact. 
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